David Ray Griffin
[link to CV]
Essays by Me
Essays by Others
Journal of Consciousness Studies,
No. 3, 1997, pp. 248-68.
Griffin’s exposition of the status of the question, and his
answer to it, are foundational
to my emerging philosophy. In
March 2007, S.U.N.Y. Press published
Griffin’s Whitehead's Radically Different Postmodern
Philosophy: An Argument for Its Contemporary Relevance, a
collection of papers that
does not include this one, but does include a chapter on
panexperientialism. I took the liberty of breaking up
most of the paragraphs into smaller units. The four notes and
bibliographical references appear at the end of section VI.
David Ray Griffin
intractable (not merely hard) mind-body problem, which involves accounting
for freedom as well as conscious experience, is created by the assumption
that the brain is comprised of insentient things. Chalmers is right,
accordingly, to suggest that we take experience as fundamental.
this starting-point, the hard problem is twofold: to see sufficient reason
to adopt this long-despised approach, and to develop a plausible theory
based on it.
We have several reasons, I suggest, to reject the notion of
“vacuous actuality” and to adopt, instead, the view that all true
individuals have experience and spontaneity.
After suggesting criteria
for an acceptable theory, chief among which are “hard-core common-sense
notions,” I point out why dualism and materialism have been unable to fulfil
strength of dualism has been its organizational duality, the strength of
materialism its rejection of ontological dualism.
I suggest that panexperientialist physicalism, by
allowing for “compound individuals” and thereby a “nondualistic
interactionism” that combines these strengths, can provide a theory that
overcomes the problems of materialist physicalism.
Conceptual Dimension of the Problem