Panentheism.  Revisionism.  Anarchocapitalism.



Essays by Me

Essays by Others

Process, Insight, and Empirical Method 

An Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for Foundational Theology.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 1983

Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.

Chapter I:

Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Empirical Scientific Method and Philosophic Method [continued] 


Lonergan’s Interpretation of Scientific and Philosophic Method  


The Method of Empirical Science and Philosophy

Since I will be considering all the topics of this section in more detail in Chapter III of my study, my discussion here will be much briefer than in the last section.  But I must present at least in summary fashion how Lonergan conceives the relations between empirical scientific method and philosophy in order to begin formulating my thesis and to prepare for the task of Chapter II. 

It is easiest to understand the broad lines of Lonergan’s conception of the relation between empirical scientific method and philosophy if we recall his reasons for undertaking such an extensive analysis of empirical scientific method. [See Thesis, pp. 53-56.]  His inquiry is into the nature of human understanding itself.  He has studied empirical scientific method because it provides clear and precise examples of the different kinds of activities that constitute the successive levels of the cognitional process, because the transition to modern physics presents a good deal of evidence about the nature of knowing, and because the faith of the scientist is pinned not on any particular scientific conclusion but on the validity of scientific method itself.  Lonergan’s purpose, then, is to move through and beneath empirical scientific method in order to come to an understanding of understanding, to a knowing of human knowing.  Lonergan is convinced that only by beginning with such an understanding and knowing of human understanding and knowing can philosophy (and ultimately, theology) proceed on a constructive path in the modern period.

I will attempt to summarize Lonergan’s interpretation of the relation between empirical scientific method and philosophy in the following way.  First, I will consider the relation of scientific method to the development of cognitional theory, epistemology, and philosophic method.  Secondly, I will consider the development of transcendental metaphysics and the relation between metaphysics and science and scientific method.  Finally, I will indicate why Lonergan’s discussion of the world view implied by his interpretation of empirical scientific method presents a puzzle to me, and I will try to determine its relation to his understanding of metaphysics.


Cognitional Theory, Epistemology, and the Method of Philosophy

We recall that at several significant points in his study of empirical scientific method Lonergan notes that there are two sorts of data and, consequently, two modes of cognitional process: the data of sense and the data of consciousness, the direct mode of cognitional process investigating the former, the introspective mode the latter. [See ibid., pp. 75, 85.]  We also recall Lonergan’s statement that if empirical method, at least in its essential features, could be applied to the data of consciousness, the result would be “a generalized empirical method. [Insight, p. 74; and Thesis, p. 75.] Finally, we recall that the reason Lonergan embarks on his extensive analysis of empirical scientific method was not to exhibit his familiarity with modern science nor to prove himself a philosopher of science, but rather a desire to reach, identify and explain the elements of “the dyanmic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity. [Insight, p. xxii; see Thesis, p. 55.] These positions provide the point of departure for the development of philosophy in Lonergan’s thought in the way that I will now try to explain.

First of all, in his analysis of the various elements and operations and the dynamic pattern in which they occur and recur, Lonergan did not discover something unique to the empirical sciences.  As we have seen implicitly throughout the study,

Lonergan states this repeatedly both in direct statements and in his use of examples.   He treats this matter at some length in Insight in Chapters VI and VII on common sense, consideration of which I omitted as not directly relevant to my analysis of his ‘interpretation of empirical scientific method.

these operations and their dynamic pattern are to be found in any example of human cognitional knowing. In principle, one might begin philosophical reflection by considering any act of human knowing.  The reason most of the examples in the first five chapters of Insight are drawn from mathematics and the empirical sciences (especially physics) is because of the clarity, precision, and success they have to offer.  In any case, the identification of these operations provides the starting point for the application of a generalized empirical method to the data of consciousness. Or, as Lonergan puts it,

the three levels of the direct mode of cognitional process [i.e., empirical scientific method] provide the data for the introspective mode; and as the direct mode, so also the introspective unfolds on the three levels, an initial level of data, a second level of understanding and formulation, and a third level of reflection and judgment. [Insight, p. 274.]

An inquiry in the introspective mode of cognitional process will eventuate in a cognitional theory and then the higher viewpoint of an epistemology.  But before attempting to explain this according to Lonergan’s analysis, perhaps a more general presentation might clarify what Lonergan is proposing and doing here.

We might say that Lonergan is proposing a hypothesis and is intending to follow empirical method (in its essential features) to test that hypothesis.  He has observed that empirical science is a successful kind of knowing, and that it is precise and clear in its operations.  He has further observed that scientists (and, we might add, the general public) have great faith in the validity of the scientific way of knowing.  Perhaps he notes that there seem to be correlations between some factors in the method of empirical science and some factors in the exercise of rationality in non-scientific thought.  He has an insight that perhaps beneath all forms of cognitional knowing there lies the same basic method and that this method operates according to norms inherent in the cognitional process itself.  This insight is then expressed in the hypothesis: there is a normative dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity. This hypothesis must be tested, and this is where cognitional theory comes in.  But cognitional theory does not begin on the level of deduction and prediction and the devising of thought experiments to test this hypothesis.  As in the case in much work of the empirical sciences, before the hypothesis can be tested an investigator must return to the stage or level of observation and description in order to determine precisely what it is that is going to be tested for.  Or, to put it another way, the hypothesis demands an acuteness of observation and description before the hypothesis can be stated precisely enough to be tested.  And so the verification of Lonergan’s hypothesis involves beginning again at the level of observation and description, and the first ten chapters of Insight are the developments that are necessary in order for the verification made.  The eleventh chapter, “Self-Affirmation of the Knower,” is where the judgment of verification is actually made.  But it is to be noted that this first verification (the final moment of cognitional theory) results only in the judgment that the operations described do occur, that they occur in the particular pattern hypothesized by the investigation, and that this pattern is verified as immanent in the facts of cognitional process (which means that the pattern itself cannot be revised). [See Method, pp. 16-20; Insight, pp. 276-277, 304, 335-336.] A great deal of evidence has been accumulated, but all that has been affirmed or verified is that this is what people do when they think they are knowing.  There is yet the further question: how do we know that this is really knowing?  (Or, as Lonergan phrases this question for intelligence, “why is doing that knowing?” [Method, p. 25.])  This launches the further inquiry that will end by affirming that this immanent pattern of operations is knowing; and this inquiry is an epistemology.  Thus the development of Lonergan’s philosophy begins as the attempt to verify an hypothesis using the essential features of empirical method and applying that method to the data of human consciousness rather than to the data of sense, and it continues by pursuing the further questions that arise.  Let us now see in slightly more detail how his cognitional theory and epistemology develop.

As we have seen, cognitional theory begins by observing and describing the operations involved in the cognitional process.  It would be possible to go through my discussions in the previous section and show how Lonergan’s analysis follows the basic pattern of empirical method, but that does not seem necessary to me.  The important point is that cognitional theory discovers the operations, their relation, their normative pattern of occurrence, their recurrence, and their immanence in the cognitional process.  The hypothesis has been prepared for testing.  The test is whether or not one can affirm that this description and explanation of the cognitional process is really so.  It is in the formulation of this test that Lonergan takes the “turn to the subject:” the question for reflection is “Am I a knower?”

Insight, p. 319.  For the sake of brevity I will here omit discussion of how this question is answered in the self-affirmation of the knower, but I will take it up in Chapter III.

It is to be noted that this “turn to the subject” does not appear out of the thin air;’ the way has been prepared for it all along by a constant reference of the operations to the operator.

While this is clear in Insight itself, it is more compendiously expressed in the summaries of Method, pp. 7-20, and of “Cognitional Structure,” Collection, pp. 222-227.

The inquiry all along has been into the human subject as knower, and when the affirmation is made that, yes, I am a knower, the cognitional hypothesis has been verified and the inquirer now has a basic method that can be used to continue his or her inquiry into the further questions that express philosophical problems. Lonergan calls this method “transcendental method.”

Method, pp. 13-20.  There is a significant development in Lonergan’s vocabulary and thought between Insight and Method.  While I will consider these developments in Chapter III, I here prescind from such considerations for the sake of brevity.

It is the most basic pattern of the process of human knowing, and is at work in any and all instances of human knowing.  But it is in making this method conscious and objectifying it (i.e., in the development of cognitional theory) that philosophy gains its central method.  Lonergan summarizes the inquiry of cognitional theory in the following way.  If one denotes the various operations by reference to the principal activity on each of the levels of human consciousness, one can summarize the basic pattern of operations as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

Method, p. 14.  Note that Lonergan here speaks of a fourth level of human consciousness that in Insight does not appear until Chapter XVIII, “The Possibility of Ethics.”

Objectifying this pattern so as to arrive at transcendental method consists in:

(1) experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) understanding the unity and relations of one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood! affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.  [Method, pp. 14-15.]

As we have seen, after the judgment affirming the reality of the normative pattern of cognitional process in the knower, a further question for intelligence arises: “Why is doing that knowing?”  In other words, the judgment terminating cognitional theory (in affirming the reality of the cognitional process) provides the first level data, observations, and descriptions for another inquiry, epistemology.  The inquirer, pondering this question, has an insight which is expressed in the epistemological hypothesis “that knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality, or more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are identical.”

“Cognitional Structure,” Collection, pp. 227-228.  Lonergan here calls this “the epistemological theorem.”  Chapters XII and XIII of Insight, pp. 348-384, are the argumentation in support of this hypothesis.  This issue is not treated at length in Method; see pp. 20-21.

The key to verifying this hypothesis lies in an analysis of the intentionality of the cognitional process, and in establishing that knowing in this way is intrinsically objective.

Thus Lonergan embarks on an analysis of the intentionality of knowing.  He notes that the pure desire to know has an objective, namely, being.  This intended objective is unrestricted and comprehensive; that is, “its ultimate goal is the universe in its full concreteness.”

“Cognitional Structure,” Collection, p. 228.  The argumentation in support of my summary can be found in Insight, pp. 348-374.

In this sense, being is identical with reality.  Lonergan argues that being, then, is to be known in judgment.  The notion of being thus constitutes the supreme heuristic notion of cognitional process.  It thus underpins and constitutes all cognitional contents as cognitional, and is the core of all meaning.  In short, the drive, the motive power of the dynamic structure of human knowing is its intrinsic relation to being, its intention of being.  The final affirmation that this is, indeed, knowing can take place once one has had the reflective insight that this cognitional process with its intention of being is inherently and intrinsically objective. [Insight, pp. 375-384.]  Lonergan establishes this by exhibiting the relation of the notion of being, correct judgments, and objectivity.  While I will not discuss the details of this argument here, I might note that it is Lonergan’s interpretation of objectivity that allows him to resolve or evade what might appear to be the central problem of epistemology: How does the knower get beyond himself to a known?”

. . . we contend that, while the knower may experience himself or think about himself without judging, still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I am. Further, we contend that other judgments are equally possible and reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are possible differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are correct it is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached in the analysis of judgment. [Ibid., p. 377.]

Before following Lonergan’s path to yet a higher viewpoint, let me pause and reconsider the relation of empirical scientific method to cognitional theory and epistemology.  First, then, empirical scientific method provide a clue for cognitional analysis; it provides the clue in the success of its knowing, but even more so in the fact that the trust of the scientist is in the validity of empirical scientific method itself, not in the contents of the sciences.  Secondly, empirical scientific method provides the data for the development of cognitional theory; it provides the data in its normative pattern of related and recurrent operations.  Or, put another way, empirical scientific method in its general and essential features is an example of transcendental method at work, calling forth and guiding the development, use, and application of all special methods within the special sciences.  It is an example of the activity of the very method (transcendental method) cognitional theory intends to reach.  Thirdly, to say that empirical scientific method is an example of transcendental method at work does not mean that empirical scientific method is a model for philosophic method. Although transcendental method is active in the employment of empirical scientific method, it is neither conscious nor objectified as transcendental, and it does not become known as the basic method of philosophy until it has been made conscious and objectified by the whole circuit of cognitional theory. What cognitional theory discovers and affirms is not that philosophic method must be modeled after empirical scientific method, but rather that underlying all methods there is a dynamic and normative pattern of recurrent and related operations which, when made conscious and objectified, not only reveals the unity in all human knowing but also provides philosophy with its basic method.  Finally, it can be said that there is a structural identity between transcendental method and empirical scientific method in its general and essential features.  The methods themselves are not identical, since empirical scientific method does not require for its application the making conscious and objectifying of transcendental method as transcendental.  Fundamentally, however, empirical scientific method and the basic method of philosophy have the same dynamic structure.


Transcendental Metaphysics and Its Relation to Science and Scientific Method

The dynamism of human knowing does not end with its discovery of transcendental method, its own basic dynamic structure.  It impels the knower to ask what is known when one is engaged in knowing, and this is the question of metaphysics.  [See ibid., Chapters XIV-XVII, pp. 385-594; and Method, pp. 20-23, 24-25.]   While a full discussion of Lonergan’s develop-ment of metaphysics must await Chapter III of my study, some brief consideration of several of those developments must be given here, especially those bearing upon empirical science and scientific method.

First of all, a metaphysics that operates in accord with the norm involved at the final moment of affirming oneself as a knower (the norm being: deciding to operate in accord with the norm immanent in the now-affirmed cognitional process [See Thesis, p. 101; and Method, pp. 15, 20.]), allows the development of a critical realism.  Here transcendental method has two distinct but related functions, a critical and a dialectical function.  [For this and what immediately follows, see Method, pp. 20-21 and Insight, pp. 385-389.] The critical function allows the inquirer to understand that disagreements between thinkers on the nature of reality can be reduced to disagreements about knowledge and objectivity.  Disagreements on objectivity can be reduced to disagreements on the activity of knowing, or cognitional theory.  Furthermore, disagreements about cognitional theory can be settled by making explicit the contradiction between a mistaken cognitional theory and the actual conduct or performance of the thinker espousing that mistaken theory.  The dialectical function of transcendental method is the determination of the “basic positions” affirmed by a critical application of transcendental method, and of the “basic counter-positions” refuted by criticism.  The “basic positions” (on the real, knowing, and objectivity [See Insight, p. 388.]) are the affirmations of cognitional theory and epistemology. The dialectical application of transcendental method allows the inquirer to deal with the multitude of philosophical arguments on these questions, reversing all counter-positions and developing all positions.  The critical and dialectical functions of transcendental method are the basic working tools of metaphysics.

But what exactly is metaphysics?  Since metaphysics is intended as the answer to the question of being (“What do I know when I’m knowing?”), and since the notion of being underlies, penetrates, and transcends all other notions [See Thesis, p. 101, and Insight, pp. 356-357.], “metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments.” [Insight, p. 390.]  But it exists in three forms or stages: latent (when it is operative but not conscious of itself); problematic (when the need for it is felt but accounts of knowing, reality, and objectivity are enmeshed in a mixture of positions and counter-positions); and explicit (when the latent metaphysics always at work succeeds in conceiving itself [Ibid., p. 391.]).  Explicit metaphysics, then, will integrate the heuristic structures of human understanding and yield an understanding of the basic structure of all there is to be known, the universe of “proportionate being.”

In its full sweep, being is whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. But being that is proportionate to human knowing not only is to be understood and affirmed but also is to be experienced. So proportionate being may be defined as whatever is to be known by human experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. [Ibid.]

Explicit metaphysics can then be defined as “the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” [Ibid.] What Lonergan means by an “integral heuristic structure” is this.  As we have seen in Lonergan’s analysis of the elements of insight, further discussed in his analysis of mathematics and empirical science,

prior to the understanding that issues in answers, there are the questions that anticipate answers; and as has been seen, such anticipation may be employed systematically in the determination of answers that as yet are unknown; for while the content of a future cognitional act is unknown, the general characteristics of the act itself not only can be known but also can supply a premise that leads to the act.  A heuristic notion, then, is the notion of an unknown content and it is determined by anticipating the type of act through which the unknown would become known.  A heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions.  Finally, an integral heuristic structure is the ordered set of all heuristic notions. [Ibid., p. 392.]

Metaphysics does not invent or create heuristic notions and structures.  They are the products of human intelligence at work in life and in the specialized sciences and disciplines (including cognitional theory and epistemology.)  What metaphysics does is take these heuristic notions and structures made available to it by the other disciplines and integrate them so as to formulate the heuristic structure of proportionate being itself.  Thus the relation between metaphysics and the empirical sciences is to be discovered in the task and the method of metaphysics.  That relation can be summarized by considering six points.

(1) Metaphysics is in a certain sense dependent on the special sciences (as well as on all other examples of human intelligence and reasonableness).  As just mentioned, metaphysics does not invent its own data; it receives its data from the sciences, other disciplines, and from reflections on life as lived (common sense).

Metaphysics does not undertake either to discover or to teach science; it does not undertake either to develop or to impart common sense; it does not pretend to know the universe of proportionate being independently of science and common sense; but it can and does take over the results of such distinct efforts, it works them into coherence by revising their counter-positions, and it knits them into a unity by discerning in them the concrete prolongations of the integral heuristic structure which it itself is. [Ibid., p. 393.]

(2) As this quotation also indicates, the appropriation by metaphysics of these heuristic notions and structures is not uncritical.  Because of the various biases and confused notions on reality, objectivity, and knowing to which the human subject so easily falls victim, the metaphysical appropriation of the sciences’ heuristic notions and structures involves critical evaluation in order to reverse any counter-positions in which they may be expressed and to express them instead in the basic positions worked out by cognitional theory and epistemology. [See ibid., pp. 388, 398-399.] This critical appropriation adds coherence to the “results” of the special sciences.

(3) Metaphysics unifies the sciences (or offers the real possibility of such unification) “by discerning in them the concrete prolongations of the integral heuristic structure which it itself is.”  That is, metaphysics discerns in the special sciences the concrete applications of all heuristic notions, and in doing so it establishes the fundamental unity of the sciences.

See Method, p. 24, where Lonergan applies this also to the integration of all knowing.

(4) and (5) Intimately related to the point I have just mentioned, the critical appropriation and unification of the sciences also has two other important effects for the sciences.  It grounds the sciences by anchoring their special methods in the dynamic structure of human knowing; and it gives the sciences the general view of the whole the sciences are trying to understand.

If the metaphysician must leave to the physicist the understanding of physics and to the chemist the understanding of chemistry, he has the task of working out for the physicist and chemist, for the biologist and the psychologist, the dynamic structure that initiates and controls their respective inquiries and, no less, the general characteristics of the goal towards which they head. [Insight, p. 498; see also pp. 507-509.]

This view of metaphysics as giving scientists “the general characteristics of the goal towards which they head” does not infringe upon the proper autonomy of the sciences, for the metaphysical elements in Lonergan’s interpretation are only the structure; they possess no content of their own.

. . . they express the structure in which one knows what proportionate being is; they outline the mould in which an understanding of proportionate being necessarily will flow; they arise from understanding and they regard proportionate being, not as understood, but only as to be understood.

. . . If one wants to know just what forms are, the proper procedure is to give up metaphysics and turn to the sciences; for forms become known inasmuch as the sciences approximate towards their ideal of complete explanation; and there is no method, apart from scientific method, by which one can reach such explanation. [Ibid., pp. 497-498.]

(6) Since metaphysics is not dealing only with the sciences, but with all other disciplines and “common sense” as well, there results from metaphysics an integration of the sciences with all other human cognitional activity, and this might be called an integration of all knowing. Thus the final service of metaphysics to the sciences is to bring them into relationship not only with each other but also with all other forms of cognitional knowing.

Finally, it should be noted that Lonergan claims an essential stability for this metaphysics. [See ibid., pp. 393-394.] This is not to say that there cannot be modifications and improvements made in the expression of it, but in order to do so one would have to employ exactly the transcendental method Lonergan has described and explained. To the extent that one’s cognitional theory and epistemology are correct, to that extent one will be able to specify the basic metaphysical elements that are not based on any particular content or forms, but rather on the fundamental and unchanging dynamic structure of human knowing. Since that essential structure cannot change, neither can the essential structure of metaphysics.


Emergent Probability, Metaphysics, and Science

Having seen in the two preceding subsections the direction Lonergan’s analysis of empirical scientific method takes him in the development of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, I will conclude with what is for me still a puzzle: the relation of the “world view” of emergent probability to the empirical sciences and to metaphysics.  The full discussion of this puzzle properly belongs to Chapter III of my study, and so all I wish to do here is indicate why it is a puzzle for me and outline very briefly a possible way of resolving the puzzle.

Lonergan develops his account of “emergent probability” in Chapter IV of Insight, “The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations.”  

Ibid., pp. 115-128; see pp. 128-139 for Lonergan’s contrast of this world view with those associated with the names of Aristotle, Galileo, Darwin, and the world view called Indeterminism.

Lonergan has previously argued that classical and statistical investigations are complementary in their structure of knowing. [See Thesis, pp. 79-80.] Now he argues that since there must be some correspondence between knowing and known, his affirmation of both classical and statistical laws necessarily implies a world view that must be made explicit.  My puzzle is that I am not sure which department of human knowledge produces or expresses this world view.  It bears the ear-marks of a cosmology, yet it is not produced by generalizing any of the particular ideas of the sciences, but rather by an analysis of the structure of empirical method.  Hence this world view is not produced by the sciences themselves, nor is it based on any content of the sciences, and Lonergan asserts that it is independent of any changes that might occur in the content of the sciences. [Insight, pp. 116-117.] Yet Lonergan asserts that this view of world order is an explanatory account of the intelligibility immanent in world process, and that it is thus “within the limits of empirical method.” [Ibid., p. 128.]

If this cosmology is not produced by the sciences and is not dependent on the content of the sciences, then is it produced by cognitional theory?  Apparently not; at least cognitional theory alone is not enough to produce such a world view.  The affirming judgment terminating cognitional theory has not yet affirmed that the cognitional process is objective knowing of the real, only that it is what one does when one thinks one is knowing.  Likewise, epistemology and cognitional theory alone cannot produce this world view.  First, while epistemology affirms that the cognitional process is objective knowing of the real, it does not concern itself with what is known, only with the knowing.  Secondly, the critical and dialectical functions of transcendental method are necessary in order to establish such a world view, develop its basic positions, contrast it with competing world views, reverse the basic counter-positions of those world views, and affirm that, indeed, emergent probability is the world view implied by the dynamic structure of human knowing.  But the critical and dialectical functions of transcendental method are not employed until one has begun the inquiry of metaphysics.  Thus it seems that it is metaphysics that produces this world view.  This interpretation seems substantiated when Lonergan again discusses emergent probability in the chapter on “Elements of Metaphysics.” [Ibid., p. 462.]

I will briefly indicate here why this is a point of some interest to me.  The world view of emergent probability is an explanatory account of the intelligibility of world process that falls within the limits of empirical method.  It thus might prove helpful to scientists in some way.  Yet this is not its main purpose.  Rather, in my provisional understanding, the principal purpose of this world view is to offer an explanation of why and how the sciences can explain.  This might seem to be a matter of small account, but it is actually rather important for my study since, as I noted above, it is also Whitehead’s understanding that the purpose of metaphysical explanation is not to explain concreteness, but to explain the possibility of abstraction (which is in his philosophy the way in which explanations are produced). [See Thesis, pp. 50-51.] Hence if the production of the world view of emergent probability is correctly placed within the department of metaphysics, and if I have interpreted Lonergan’s meaning correctly, this provides a point of contact and similarity between Lonergan’s and Whitehead’s conception of the role of metaphysics. From this initial clue it might prove possible to argue to a certain degree of compatibility between two metaphysical positions that initially appear to be quite incompatible.


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A Comparison of Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Scientific and Philosophic Method

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