From 
		The American Political Science Review, 51:3, Sep. 1957, 776-787.  A 
		reply from Samuel P. Hunting-ton, perhaps best known as the author of 
		The Clash of Civilizations, was published in the next issue (51:4, 
		Dec. 1957, 1063-1064) and is appended to Roth-bard’s piece 
		
		hereinunder.  I can 
		find no record of his opinion of Huntington’s reply, but would 
		appreciate hearing from any one who knows what it was.  
		
		
		Anthony Flood
		
		
		January 12, 2010
		 
		 
		
		
		Huntington on Conservatism: A Comment
		
		Murray N. Rothbard
		 
		
		
		After cogently demonstrating that conservatism can only be a purely 
		situational rather than ideational ideology—a defense of any existing 
		institutions against fundamental challenge—Professor Hunting-ton ends 
		his article by calling on liberalism to liquidate itself “for the 
		duration.”1  Defining the challenge to American institutions 
		as communism, Huntington urges American liberals to “lay aside their 
		liberal ideology” and adopt conservatism as their defense until the 
		communist threat is ended.  Yet, on his own evidence, the precedents for 
		this advice are dismal indeed.  For everyone of the four great 
		manifestations of conservatism he lists (the defense of the estates 
		against the rise of absolute monarchy; the defense against Puritan 
		dissent; the defense against the French Revolution; and the defense of 
		the South against abolition) failed signally in its object. Since all 
		these conservative upsurges lost to the forces of radical change, and 
		since defense of the old order was their only purpose, Huntington’s 
		willingness to rely on this weapon now is puzzling indeed. 
		
		
		
		But this is not all.  If conservatism is hopeless as a weapon to defend 
		the institutional status quo, then, on Huntington’s own terms, it 
		is also a pointless and absurd ideology, since it has no inherent 
		ideational validity.  Perhaps the consistent failure of conser-vatism in 
		its previous struggles with one radical ideology after another can be 
		explained more fully. As Huntington points out, so long as existing 
		institutions are universally accepted, there is no need for a 
		conservative ideology of defense. Conservatism arises in reaction to the 
		attractions of a new ideational philosophy, one necessarily radical and 
		at variance with current institutions.  But, on Huntington’s own 
		account, conservatism is not a rational defense of these institutions, 
		but rather the contrary: a blindly tropistic hostility to change, 
		whatever it may be.  Pitting a coherent ideology against a tropism will 
		tend to provoke an unequal contest, with the ideational philosophy the 
		victor. For men, even those who care little about constructing a 
		philosophic system, must have some set of idea-tional principles 
		with which to view social institutions. The deeply interested parties 
		search for a set of principles, and the less interested are generally 
		content to accept their principles from socially appointed leaders whom 
		they respect.  But some set of principles must be chosen.  The necessity 
		for this choice is indicated by Huntington’s admission that the reason 
		the society was not previously in turmoil was that everyone had adopted 
		the same ideational system, and only quarreled over interpretations 
		within that system.  It was precisely the flowering of a contrasting 
		set of principles that constituted the challenge to existing 
		institutions.  But if society must choose some ideational viewpoint, and 
		if conser-vatism is not ideational at all, then conservatism will 
		necessarily fail in the struggle.  For a radical idea-tional ideology 
		tries to convince people by the use of reason, while the conservative 
		ideology, relying on blind instinct, can only scorn reason.  Now, 
		conceding to the enemy the monopoly of reason is fatal, for any ideology 
		whatever can appeal to emotions alone. The set of ideas which seems to 
		have reason on its side possesses the great advantage of the force of 
		conviction that, in the long run, is likely to overcome mere resistance 
		to the new and unfamiliar.  For the once new, as Huntington himself 
		points out, soon becomes the familiar and old; and this applies to 
		ideologies as well as institutions.  By Huntington’s own (and accurate) 
		definition, communism itself is rapidly becoming “conservative.” 
		
		
		
		The proper answer to the radical challenge of a new ideology is to adopt 
		not conservatism but a contrasting radicalism, to oppose reason with 
		reason.  If this means changing existing institutions, then so much the 
		better.  Since Huntington is professedly a “liberal” (however the term 
		be defined), the rational approach for him to adopt toward American 
		institutions is to transform them to accord more nearly with the liberal 
		ideal.  This should be the “answer” to communism, an answer in rational, 
		ideational terms.  Since it is not arguable, blind adherence to the 
		status quo is no “answer” at all. 
		
		
		Why indeed does Huntington support the existing institutions?  His 
		article gives only brief hints, but enough to demonstrate a striking and 
		inherent incon-sistency of conservatism: while basically situational, it 
		is still, almost shame-facedly, ideational in part. Thus, Huntington 
		argues for conservatism as follows: “conservatism is the intellectual 
		rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of human 
		existence.  It has a high and necessary function.  It is the rational 
		defense of being against mind, of order against chaos, . . . of the 
		institutional prerequisites of social order” (pp. 460, 473).  If 
		conservatism has indeed so exalted a role, then it is not, as Huntington 
		asserts, a purely positional ideology; it is ideational as well.  For 
		what can be more systematic and ideational—more rational—than an 
		assertion of the necessities of existence?  Clearly Huntington has 
		overdrawn his case; conservatism is ideational as well as situational.
		
		
		
		Let us examine Huntington’s six-point list of the generally agreed-upon 
		conservative creed.  Points (2) and (6) are clearly and solely 
		situational; the appeal to “prescription” and the presumption for 
		settled government are purely tropistic appeals to the status quo 
		whatever it may be.  These bear out Huntington’s thesis.  But the other 
		points have differ-ent implications.  Point (1), that man is a religious 
		animal, can be positional, in lending divine sanction to the status quo. 
		 It can also cut the other way, however, by providing a buttress for the 
		self-same universal principles of natural law that Huntington recognizes 
		as the age-old enemy of conservatism. Point (4), that the community is 
		superior to the individual and that human nature is the source of evil, 
		is irrelevant to situational concerns.  It is, on the contrary, an 
		ideational statement.  In an existent laissez-faire, 
		individualist society, for example, such a position would imply radical, 
		and therefore ideational, changes from current institutions.  The same 
		is true of point (5), that men are unequal and that hierarchy is 
		inevitable.  For example, if a few members of an Israeli kibbutz 
		were to put forth this doctrine it would be radical indeed.  Of the six 
		cardinal features of the conservative creed, therefore, two are 
		situational, two are ideational, and one can be used in either way.
		
		
		
		I have purposely held to the last his point (3), that reason should be 
		eschewed in favor of habit and emotion—that logic should be abandoned 
		for concrete experience—because, while situational, this doctrine holds 
		special interest.  For it is not only situational; it is an implicit 
		confession that the ideational strands in the defenses of 
		existing institutions are so weak that they fail to stand up under 
		analysis.  In short, the conservative, after putting forth ideational 
		doctrines, refuses to defend them by the use of reason.  Apparently 
		believing them too weak for defense, he retreats to take his stand 
		finally upon habit and emotion and to leave reason to his enemies.  This 
		is the ultimate and really distinguishing feature of the conservative 
		philoso-phy. 
		
		
		Conservatism should either be defined as a situational or as an 
		ideational ideology; otherwise, hopeless confusion of meanings will 
		continue indefin-itely. If conservatism is best defined positionally, 
		and I agree with Huntington that this is the best definition, then 
		points (4) and (5), and probably (1), should be dropped from the catalog 
		of conservative views. The ideational strands should be separated out, 
		and used to form a frankly ideational and radical system. 
		
		
		
		Huntington’s necessary “prerequisites” are, then, ideational, and not 
		conservative at all.  The footnote in which he denies the possibility of 
		a “conservative defense of sheer chaos” and his designation of Nazi 
		Germany as “chaos,” is an attempt to escape his dilemma (p. 459n).  For 
		if conservatism is situational and necessary, then all existing 
		institutions must and should be defended, including Nazi institutions 
		when they were in existence.  Hence Huntington’s attempt to banish 
		totalitarian societies from the rubric of “existing institutions.”  But 
		he cannot have it both ways.  If conservatism is good, then this 
		situational defense of the status quo is good always and 
		everywhere, whatever institutions exist: whether they be liberal, 
		communist, Nazi, slave, or canni-balistic.  On the other hand, if he 
		would balk at defense of anyone set of institutions, then he has already 
		abandoned conservatism for good and all: he has transcended the immanent 
		and adopted the ideational.  The question, in short, is not whether he 
		approves of Americans defending their existing institutions against 
		challenge.  The critical question is: does he equally approve of such 
		defense by Soviet Russia, South Africa, and Yemen? 
		
		
		Huntington is very severe with the New Conser-vatives.  He calls them 
		vague as to the institutions they would defend and the enemies they 
		would counteract.  He sees communism as the only plau-sible threat to 
		America.  But the New Conservatives do not agree.  It seems to me that 
		most of them are quite clear on the nature of the enemy: it is 
		democratic socialism.  The New Conservatives therefore oppose: (1) the 
		economic and political system of socialism, i.e., the complete 
		control by the state of the economic and political order; and (2) the 
		social and cultural implications of democracy, i.e., egalitarianism, 
		mass culture, the divine right of the majority, the worship of the 
		“common man,” etc. And hence, the New Conservatives oppose, not only the 
		totalitarian systems abroad, but also the New-Fair Deals at home, as 
		part and parcel of the modern wave of social democracy.  (Liberal 
		democrats may wonder at this classification of totalitarianism under 
		forms of Social Democracy.  But the New Conser-vatives hold that modern 
		totalitarian movements depend peculiarly on collective support.) 
		
		
		
		Much more just is Huntington’s charge that the New Conservatives are 
		vague about what they positively wish to defend.  The reason for this 
		vagueness is clear, however; it stems from the utter lack of agreement 
		among the New Conservatives, and among the contemporary Right generally, 
		on the nature of the world they would like to see brought into being. 
		 And, of course, Huntington is absolutely correct on one point: the New 
		Conservatives are not really conservative at all.  They are not really
		defending any more, if they ever did; they are fighting against 
		trends which have already and increasingly prevailed.  They are 
		therefore ardent radicals, in the root sense.  But they and their 
		critics have not realized this, or have not conceded it, partly because 
		of the lack of agreement within their ranks. Since the New Conservatives 
		can unite only in opposition to the enemy, and never on the positive 
		advancement of a consistent creed, their public stance tends always to 
		seem purely “negative” and situational.  But the positive ideational 
		creeds are there: some New Conservatives are laissez faire 
		individualists, some Tory feudalists, some ardent decentralists, some 
		monarchists, etc.  Strategically, these differences tend to be buried, 
		in order to create a Popular Front of opposition.  But the 
		“conservative” label is a most misleading term to apply to this 
		congeries of opposition.  The true conservatives in America today are 
		the defenders of the current status quo.  The fact that so many 
		former liberals have shifted to the “conservative” mantle is highly 
		significant, for it seems to mean that liberals have begun to lose faith 
		in the liberal ideology, and must therefore turn to tropistic 
		conservatism as a final defense of what is.  But if historical 
		precedents are prophetic, this means that liberalism is doomed and that 
		either communism or one of the ideational creeds of the Right opposition 
		bids fair to become the “wave of the future.” 
		
		1 
		Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism As An Ideology,” this Review, 
		Vol. 51 (June, 1957), pp. 454-473.
		 
		
		
		Samuel P. Huntington’s Letter of Reply to Murray N. Rothbard
		
		 
		
		
		To the Editor: 
		
		
		Dr. Rothbard makes a number of remarks in his comment (September issue, 
		pp. 784-7) from which I must vigorously dissent. 
		
		
		He argues that groups espousing the conserva-tive ideology have been 
		uniformly unsuccessful in achieving their objectives, and he attributes 
		this failure to the poverty of conservatism as an ideology. In the first 
		place, ideology only influences, it does not determine the outcome of 
		conflict between social groups.  Other factors—economic, social, 
		military—are of equal or greater importance.  Nor, unfortu-nately, is it 
		true, as he argues, that the more rational a political theory, the more 
		likely it is to succeed.  If this appealing variation of the philosophy 
		of progress were valid, Greece and Rome might still be the centers of 
		world civilization.  Secondly, Dr. Rothbard’s history is wrong in 
		places.  To be sure, on the Continent the medieval estates generally 
		went down before the national monarchs and in our Civil War the South 
		went down before the North.  But what of the other conservative efforts? 
		 Was Hooker’s defense against the Puritan dissent a failure?  The Church 
		of England is still the established church, and in 1689, after a century 
		of strife between political and religious extremists, England returned 
		to the path which Hooker had counseled.  It was Hooker, and neither 
		Hobbes nor Winstanley, whom Locke invoked and whose viewpoint prevailed 
		in the end.  Nor was the conservative reaction to the French Revolution 
		a failure.  For better or for worse, the ideological, social, and 
		military forces of the Revolution could not crack the existing structure 
		of society in England, Germany, and eastern Europe.  The Congress of 
		Vienna shaped the pattern of events on the Continent for a century to 
		come.  If Appomattox was a conservative defeat, by the same token 
		Waterloo was a conservative victory. 
		
		
		Dr. Rothbard argues that conservatism is inher-ently irrational; it is 
		“a blindly tropistic hostility to change” and “on Huntington’s own 
		account, conservatism is not a rational defense” of existing 
		institutions.  Here he defeats himself a few sentences further on, when 
		he quotes my description of conservatism as “the rational defense of 
		being against mind, of order against chaos . . . .”  He assumes, but 
		does not demonstrate, that “to oppose reason with reason” it is 
		necessary to adopt “a contrasting radicalism,” in short, that only 
		radicalism is rational.  He does not define what he means by “reason” 
		and “rational,” but any reasonable definition would either invalidate 
		his assumption or force him into a circular argument.  Evidently, there 
		can be rational and irrational attacks on existing institutions and 
		rational and irrational defenses of them.  Were Hooker and Burke 
		irrational?  Has America produced any more rational political thinkers 
		than John Adams and John C. Calhoun?  It would take quite an effort to 
		reduce the cold logic of A Disquisition on Government to an 
		appeal to “blind instinct.”  Adherence to the status quo may 
		indeed at times be “blind,” as Dr. Rothbard suggests, but, at other 
		times, it may stem from the rational decision that in the light of 
		certain ideational values the maintenance of existing institutions is 
		the most desirable of the feasible social alternatives, and 
		consequently, that conservatism is the most rational ideology to 
		espouse.  His argument that conser-vatism is necessarily irrational 
		because it stresses the irrationality in man equates a theory of 
		irrationalism with irrational theory. 
		
		
		He implies that a conservative who defends one set of existing 
		institutions must defend all existing institutions: one who conserves 
		American institutions must also conserve those in “Soviet Russia, South 
		Africa, and Yemen.”  But this ignores the basic thesis of the article 
		that conservatism is situational: it is the product of a specific 
		pattern of social forces in a given situation.  Though conservatism as a 
		theory is the theoretical rationale of all existing institutions, a 
		conservative as an individual only wishes to defend a specific set of 
		institutions. He only espouses conservatism temporarily, in that 
		situation, until the challenge to the institutions is victorious or 
		dissipated.  Nor is it a reflection on conservatism that it cannot be 
		used to defend fascism.  Fascism, as it existed in Germany and, to a 
		lesser extent, in Italy, was a permanent attack upon stable 
		institutions—radicalism of the most destructive and nihilistic sort.
		
		
		
		Finally, Dr. Rothbard argues that liberalism is doomed if liberals today 
		abandon their liberal ideology and espouse conservatism.  I have touched 
		above on the weaknesses in the historical analogy by which he attempts 
		to support this conclusion, but another fallacy also exists in this 
		argument.  The problem of the United States today in relation to the 
		rest of the world is that we are so absorbed in our own ideals that we 
		find it impossible to believe that other nations cannot be absorbed in 
		them also. However, the noncommitted portion of the world seems to be 
		about as afraid of a crusading American liberalism as of a crusading 
		Russian communism.  The way to develop support among the neutrals then 
		is to prove to them that unlike the Soviet Union we have no desire to 
		make them over in our own image.  Our problem, as Hartz says, is to 
		transcend our own experience.  It is to recognize that the liberal 
		institutions which are appropriate for us have little relevance in Asia, 
		the Mideast, the satellite countries, or even, in many respects, in 
		western Europe; and that our proper aim, as liberals, is to insure that 
		they are maintained here.  As Dr. Rothbard recognizes and deplores, 
		American liberals are tending toward conservatism.  Such a develop-ment, 
		however, is not a sign of doom but of maturity. John Dewey and Henry 
		Wallace were appropriate for the 1930s; Reinhold Niebuhr and George 
		Kennan are required in the 1950s.
        
        
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